Links Between East and West 27 Stateness 东西方的连接27 - 国家相关的概念

Introduction

One of the most pressing and significant arguments today is around the concept of “stateness”. This argument is not new. Since the advent of the first city-states in Sumeria, human civilization has been on an exploratory path to seek the ideal state. From the 19th century onwards, two major paths appeared. One focuses on the strength of the state to achieve a perfect polity, while the other focuses on changing the scope of the state. This essay will investigate these two sides of this argument and, with case studies, argue that leaders should prioritize the strength of state institutions over the scope of state functions. Then, based on this argument, the essay will attempt to prove that the strength can be unrelated to the scope of a state.

Definitions

To begin with, it is necessary to define strength versus scope. Max Weber described the state as “a human community that [successfully] claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” From this quote, it can be inferred that the strength of a state lies in its ability to enforce: to use a system of laws and a plethora of enforcement agencies to compel citizens to comply with the rule of the state. The strength can be measured by the quality of the bureaucracy, the maintenance of law and order, and several other parameters.

The scope of a state, meanwhile, as explained by political scientist Francis Fukuyama, is “the different functions and goals taken on by governments.” Fukuyama further clarifies the functions into minimal (such as defense, law, or order), intermediate (such as addressing externalities, overcoming imperfect education), and activist, one extreme example being wealth redistribution through macro-economic policies. From one perspective, a larger scope can imply a more authoritarian government, as it would control more areas of civilian life.

During the 20th century, the debate about which factor was more important was fervent. Events such as the Great Depression, the two World Wars, and the Asian Financial Crisis caused popular opinion to sway between the two. Especially in economics, the confrontation between supporters of “big government,” led by John Maynard Keynes, and supporters of “small government,” directed by Friedrich Hayek and the Chicago School, resulted in massive changes of course in economic history. Starting from the 1990s, though, the trend of liberalization and focusing on small scope have been more prevalent. In areas like Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and impoverished regions in Asia, the “third wave of democratization” has been relentlessly implemented.

The Dangers of Blind Liberalization to Illustrate the Importance of Strength

Blind liberalization, one common form of reducing the scope of government, can be not only ineffective but also dangerous. It implies that a country moves its attention away from the strength of state institutions, concentrating its efforts only on how far-reaching they are.

One case in point is sub-Saharan countries. Before reforms aimed to adjust their politics and economics were implemented structurally, many regimes in sub-Saharan Africa could be categorized as “neopatrimonial”, using “political power to service a clientelistic network of supporters of the country’s leaders.” This neopatrimonial form of government led to a kind of behavior characterized as “predatory” by some researchers - a single individual would usually be capable of directing the majority of society’s resources towards a particular group. However, some African states also possessed a dual nature, meaning that alongside this neopatrimonial system, they had a parallel “modern bureaucracy” that carried out the routine tasks of a modern government.

From the 1980s, outside forces called for these sub-Saharan countries to cut back their scope of state functions and fully democratize. But the dual nature of many states meant that the rulers used this call as an excuse to undermine the power of the modern sectors and secretly expand the power of the neopatrimonial state. As a result, economic investment towards basic infrastructure and education, necessary fields to safely liberalize, dropped significantly, while expenditures towards the military and jobs connected with the government massively expanded. For example, in Kenya, people working in the president’s office grew from 18213 in 1971 to 43230 in 1990, showcasing the growth of the authoritarian neopatrimonial system.

This case reveals that a blind setback to the scope of state functions can lead to more severe decreases in the strength of the state, which usually does not bring the wanted outcomes of liberalization. Additionally, many sub-Saharan countries’ failure implies that a focus on liberalization can only happen when proper institutions are erected. Without proper institutions to monitor and adjust, liberalization can secretly become another way to grab dictatorial power.

Weimar Germany, shortly after World War I, can be another example. After WWI, Germany was more or less forcefully pushed onto a road of liberalization, solely cutting back on the scope of the state. The Weimar Republic did not realize political or economic stability. In particular, politically, the right to vote was extended from 14.5 million voters in 1912 to 36 million in 1919. The spread of voting power was a sign of a decrease in the scope of state functions from a period of authoritarianism. However, with barely any restrictions, political parties could mobilize far more significant numbers of voters, creating the potential for political movements to challenge and undermine the stability of the nascent democracy itself. Political violence was never far away. For instance, right-wing terrorists carried out 352 political murders just between 1919 to 1922. This chaos also set the stage for the extremist and dictatorial Nazi party to dominate the Reichstag. The political failure and the damages caused by this failure of Weimar Germany showcase the dangers of liberalization in the absence of functioning institutions, further showing why strengthening a state needs to come before reducing its scope.

The Correlation Between Strength and Success

While alluding to the reason to consider the strength of the state during decision-making, these historical cases raise the question: “How can one state reduce its scope of function while simultaneously pushing up its strength?” The introduction of a continuum with authoritarianism or totalitarianism on one side and democracy on the other is beneficial. For a state falling on the left side of the continuum to shift to the right, strengthening the administrative capacity of core institutions must come first.

Take the successful example of New Zealand, which began to reduce the reach of its state dramatically in 1984. With the passage of the State Sector Act in 1988, New Zealand ensured that its core institutions were capable and closely watched to lead reforms. Government departments had to submit monthly reports and different agencies monitored each other’s work. This prudent method to cut back on the scope of state functions resulted in the New Zealand government gaining more strength and executive power simultaneously. By the 1990s, New Zealand safely transitioned onto the right side of the continuum.

Many have the wrong perception that if a scope of state functions is huge, then that state must be terribly weak. While this argument might possess some merit, in the long run, many “big governments” were also historically capable of flexing powerful strength. The Tang Dynasty can be a pertinent case. This period of Chinese history is often viewed today as one of the most prosperous when Chinese civilization took a dominant position in the world regarding politics, economics, and cultural fusion. The Tang, however, was a solid monarchy. The state exercised control over its subject citizens, and the bureaucracy was far-reaching and held a lot of power. It was a state with a vast scope and comparable strength, at least for about 200 years.

Similarly, a nation can have a small scope and considerable strength. Athens, under the governance of Pericles, fits precisely into this category. At the peak of Athenian democracy, every individual was encouraged to participate in politics and was relatively free to decide on their own. The state was not capable of exercising significant control over its citizens. But Athenian culture and economics flourished during this period. The Greeks built grandeur works of art and architecture, such as the Parthenon Temple. The Delian League, which Athens was the head of, entered a time of economic prosperity. Although Athens plummeted into decline with the death of Pericles at the start of the Peloponnesian War, it is still arguable that the small scope of Athenian government contributed positively to the spread of democracy and other cultural values.

The Importance of Strength of State in Solving Conflicts

Renowned author Gidon Gottlieb explained in his bookNation Against State: A New Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and the Decline of Sovereignty that the concept of sovereignty has been increasingly declining – “older states are moving toward broader associations and the very notion of statehood has lost substance.” In a world of cross-cultural communication, conflicts of all sorts, ethnic, religious, political, or economic, are inevitable. The current methods to solve these conflicts are to resort to global organizations (as explained in the previous essay) and the rhetoric of human rights, greater respect, and so on. However, these solutions do not always cease the conflict. One of the main reasons is that these solutions require all the states involved to possess substantial strength, foster economic markets, implement cluster initiatives, and adopt international laws effectively. In many cases, this prerequisite is not met.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the world’s most enduring disputes between land and border. Although strife began to intensify significantly after 1947 when the United Nations adopted the Partition Plan or Resolution 181, the feud between the Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews can be traced to the end of the 19th century. People can posit different theories for the long-lasting nature of this conflict. Still, one of the most convincing is that the Israeli and Palestinian governments are too weak to push forward a conclusive end. According to the Middle East Monitor, leaders could potentially end the conflict if any side has the necessary military, economic, or political resolve. In reality, more effective negotiations still need to be made, and military skirmishes have not been conducive to solving issues. This example showcases the importance of state strength in resolving international problems, especially given that the distribution of territory or the rhetoric of humanitarianism might not work.

Conclusion

Overall, through case studies and pertinent explanations, this essay argues that one should prioritize the strength of a state over its scope of it. This essay is not a justification for authoritarianism or any dictatorship, though. In the past, dictators such as Adolf Hitler used boosting state strength as a slogan to grab and cling to power. However, given the unpredictable and perilous situation today, leaders should realize that the path to peace, prosperity, and growth may not necessarily lie in a “small government” but instead in one that can address the premises of these lofty goals effectively.

WORKS CITED

Fukuyama, Francis. State-Building : Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. Cornell University Press, 2004.

Gottlieb, Gidon. Nation against State. Council on Foreign Relations, 1993.

引言

当今世界上最重要的争论之一便是围绕 "国家政府"的概念而展开的。这种争论并不新鲜，自从苏美尔的第一个城邦出现以来，人类文明一直在探索的道路上寻求最理想的国家。从19世纪开始，出现了两个主要的探索方向。一个侧重于增强国家力量，以实现完美的政体，而另一个则更侧重于改变国家职能的范围。这篇文章将探索论题的这两个方向，并通过案例研究，论证国家力量应该在重要性上优先于国家职能的范围。基于这一论点，文章将试图证明国家力量多强大可与国家职能范围多宽广无必然的联系。

定义

首先，有必要对国家力量与国家职能范围进行定义。马克斯-韦伯将国家定义为 "一个[成功]在特定领土内合法使用武力的垄断权的人类共同体"。从这句话可以推断出，国家力量在于其执行能力，既利用法律体系和大量的执法机构来迫使公民遵守国家的规则。这种力量可以通过官僚机构的质量、对法律和秩序的维护以及其他一些参数来衡量。

同时，政治学家弗朗西斯-福山解释了国家职能范围（以下统称“范围”）是 "政府所承担的不同职能和目标"。福山进一步澄清了职能范围的概念，分为最小范围的（如国防、法律或秩序）、中等范围的（如解决经济外在性、克服不完善教育）和积极（最大）范围的，一个极端的例子便是通过宏观经济政策进行财富再分配。从一个角度来看，更大的范围可能意味着更大的政府，因为它将拥有对平民生活更多领域的控制。

在20世纪，关于哪个因素更重要的争论很激烈。1929年经济大萧条、两次世界大战、亚洲金融危机等事件，使大众舆论在两者之间摇摆不定。特别是在经济学领域，以约翰-梅纳德-凯恩斯为首的 "大政府 "支持者与以弗里德里希-哈耶克和芝加哥学派为首的 "小政府 "支持者之间的对抗，导致了经济历史进程的巨大变化。不过，从20世纪90年代开始，自由化的趋势和对缩小国家范围的论调更加普遍。尤其在拉丁美洲、撒哈拉以南非洲和亚洲贫困地区等，"第三次民主化 "一直在被坚决地实施。

盲目自由化和缩小国家范围的危险

盲目的自由化和缩小国家范围可能对增强国家实力不仅没有效果，而且还存在危险。这意味着一个国家的注意力从政府力量上的完全移开。

撒哈拉地区国家就是一个很恰当的案例。在旨在对其政治和经济进行结构性调整的改革实施之前，撒哈拉非洲的许多政权可以被归类为 "新世袭制"，即在现代制度的外衣下利用 "政治权力为国家领导人的支持者形成的客户网络服务"。这种新世袭的政府形式导致了一种被一些研究者称为 "掠夺性 "的行为：一个人通常能够将社会的大部分资源引向某个特定群体。然而，一些非洲国家拥有双重性质，也就是说，除了这种“新世袭”机构之外，它们政府里还有一个平行的，规模相对较小的"现代官僚机构"，执行现代民主政府的日常任务。

从20世纪80年代开始，外部力量要求这些撒哈拉国家削减国家职能范围，并充分实现民主化。但许多国家的双重性质意味着统治者可利用这一呼吁作为借口，破坏现代机构的力量，暗中扩大新世袭机构的权力。结果是，对基本的基础设施和教育的经济投资均大幅下降，而对军事和与政府有关的工作的支出却大量增加。例如，在肯尼亚，在总统办公室工作的人从1971年的18213人增加到1990年的43230人，显示了专制的新世袭机构的猖獗扩张。

这个案例显示，盲目删减国家职能范围会导致国家力量更严重的下降，这通常不会带来自由化想要的结果。此外，许多撒哈拉国家的失败表明，只有在建立了适当的机构后，才可以专注于自由化。如果没有适当的机构来监督和调整，自由化可能成为另一种暗中攫取独裁权力的方式。

一战后不久的魏玛德国可以作为另外一则例子。一战后，德国或多或少被强行推上了自由化的道路，完全削减了国家职能的范围。魏玛共和国并没有实现政治和经济的稳定。尤其在政治方面，投票权从1912年的1450万选民扩大到1919年的3600万。投票权的扩大是国家职能范围在自由民主化时期下降的一个标志。然而，在全然没有限制的情况下，政党能够动员更多的选民，为通过政治运动挑战和破坏新生的民主制度本身的稳定创造了可能。政治暴力从未远离过社会。例如，仅在1919年至1922年间，右翼恐怖分子就进行了352起政治谋杀。这种混乱也为极端和独裁的纳粹党霸占议会创造了条件。魏玛德国的政治失败和由此造成的损失显示了自由化在缺乏运作机构情况下的危险性，进一步说明了为什么在缩小国家范围之前需要先加强国家力量。

国家力量与成功之间的关系

这些历史案例表明了决策过程中需考虑国家力量的同时，也提出了问题："一个国家如何能在缩小其职能范围的同时推高其执行力量？" 引入一条横轴，其左边是威权主义或极权主义，右边是完全民主自由化。对于一个落在横轴左边的国家来说，要想向右边转变，必须首先加强核心机构的行政能力。

以新西兰的成功例子为例，它从1984年开始大幅减少大政府的影响力。随着1988年《国家部门法》的通过，新西兰确保其核心机构有能力并彼此制衡的来领导改革。政府部门必须提交月度报告，不同机构相互监督工作。这种审慎的削减国家职能范围的方法，使新西兰政府同时获得了更多的力量和行政能力。到了20世纪90年代，新西兰安全地过渡到了横轴的右侧。

许多人有一种错误的看法，认为如果一个国家的职能范围很大，那么这个国家一定是非常弱的。虽然这种说法从长远来看可能有一定的道理，但许多大政府在历史上也有能力发挥强大的力量。唐朝可以说是一个典型的案例。中国历史上的这一时期通常被视为最繁荣的时期之一，当时中华文明在政治、经济和文化融合方面占据了世界的主导地位。然而，当时的唐朝是一个稳固的君主制国家。国家对其臣民进行控制，官僚机构影响力巨大，掌握着大量的权力。这是一个政府职能范围巨大，且力量强大的国家，至少在大约200年的时间里是如此。

同样，一个国家也可以有很小的职能范围和相当巨大的国家力量。伯里克利治理下的雅典正好符合这一类型。在雅典民主的巅峰时期，每个人都被鼓励参与政治，并且相对自由地决定自己的事情。国家没有能力对其公民进行广泛控制。但雅典的经济、军事和文化在这一时期蓬勃发展。以雅典为首的德利安联盟（雅典与其他城邦组成的同盟，对抗斯巴达为首的伯伦奔尼撒联盟）进入了一个经济繁荣的时期，大规模的艺术和建筑作品，如帕特农神庙的建造是其文明繁荣的标志。虽然雅典在伯罗奔尼撒战争开始时随着伯里克利的死亡而陷入衰落，但仍然可以说，雅典“小政府”的模式对民主和其他文化价值的传播做出了积极的贡献。

国家实力在解决冲突中的重要性

著名作家Gidon Gottlieb在他的《民族对抗国家》中解释道，主权的概念已经日益衰落--"老牌国家正在走向更广泛的联合，国家的概念本身已经失去实质意义"。在一个跨文化交流的世界里，各种冲突，无论是种族、宗教、政治还是经济，在某种程度上都是不可避免的。目前解决这些冲突的方法是求助于全球组织（如上一篇文章所解释的）以及依托人权、相互尊重等普世价值理论。然而，这些解决方案并不总是能停止冲突。背后的一个主要原因是，这些解决方案要求所有参与的国家拥有强大的力量，能够促进经济市场，实施集群倡议，并有效地接受运用国际法。在许多情况下，这一先决条件并没有得到满足。

以色列和巴勒斯坦关于土地和边界争端是世界上最持久的冲突之一。虽然纷争在1947年联合国通过《分治计划》及第181号决议后开始明显缓解，但巴勒斯坦阿拉伯人和以色列犹太人之间的争斗可以追溯到19世纪末。人们可以为这场冲突的长期性提出不同的理论原因，但其中最令人信服的是，以色列和巴勒斯坦政府都太虚弱，无法推动一个结论性的结束。据《中东观察》报道，如果任何一方有明显压倒性的军事、经济或政治力量，那么冲突就有可能被那一方政府结束。在现实中，现在仍然需要进行更有效的谈判，而军事冲突无法推动问题的解决。这个例子显示了国家力量对解决国际问题的重要性，特别考虑到人道主义言论可能不起作用。

结论

总的来说，通过案例研究和相关的解释，这篇文章论证在大多数时候，国家的行政力量应该优先于它的执政范围。不过，这篇文章并不是为专制主义或任何形式的独裁统治作辩解。在过去，像阿道夫-希特勒这样的独裁者确实把增强国家力量作为攫取和抓住权力的一种方式。然而，鉴于今天不可预测的危险局势，领导人应该认识到，通往和平、繁荣和富强的道路不一定在于建立完全的 "小政府"，而在于能够成功达成这些崇高目标的有效国家力量。