Links Between East and West 48 War Revisited 2 东西方的连接48 - 再论战争2

On the Sociological Perspective of Warfare

For the paradoxes of war, one can explain their rationality through different perspectives. However, since war is essentially a product of society (i.e., wars only became inevitable occurrences as people coalesced into more complex and diverse societies), it is of particular interest to the author to examine the sociological perspective of war and investigate how the subject of sociology approaches this phenomenon. For the topic of warfare, juxtaposing sociology and history is helpful. Sociology aims to “extract” the theoretical roots of warfare, while history can support and verify sociological work with actual examples. This essay will exactly attempt to juxtapose these two subjects. It will demonstrate the relevance of the sociological ideas of “functionalism” and “symbolic interactionism” to some of the most classic wars in history.

The first sociological concept to explore is “functionalism.” At its essence, scholars who uphold functionalism argue that wars serve several important functions. One such function is to increase social solidarity. In the war scenario, a society defeats a commonly perceived foe. The postulation that wars can act as a social adhesive is part of the social paradox of warfare outlined in the previous article. In history, Mao Zedong utilized warfare as a powerful adhesive. Before 1937, when Japan invaded China, the Chinese were not unified as a single force. Although the Kuomintang, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, was the most dominant force in China at the time, social unrest prevented the Chinese society from being unified, especially after Chiang proposed his controversial plan to not respond directly to Japanese aggression. Hence, when Mao rose to prominence in the Communist Party, he used the war against Japan to call for social unification. In 1937, the Communist Party and the Kuomintang formed the Second United Front, indicating the formation of a national collective effort to combat the Japanese. Without the war, it might be more difficult for the Chinese people to unite as one under that complex political circumstance.

Scholars who espouse “functionalism” additionally claim that wars sometimes lead to the development of the “nation-state” and, in some cases, an empire. This point possesses quite some merit as, in history, the leaders of future nations and empires consistently employed warfare to obtain and maintain a fair amount of territory for their state. As the Roman Republic weakened, Julius Caesar utilized wars of conquest to restabilize the Roman civilization and build the cornerstones of the Roman Empire. However, when one considers the social impacts of warfare from the lens of “functionalism,” one must analyze how wars, through establishing states and empires, further promote a set of values or principles. To illustrate, Alexander the Great was arguably one of the most successful historical figures who employed wars of conquest to establish a vast empire. Even though his empire collapsed almost immediately after his death in 323 B.C.E., the sociocultural legacies of his empire persisted. Owing to his conquest efforts, Hellenistic ideas, traditions, and values evolved into irreplaceable roots of European civilization. The Roman society that entered the historical stage two centuries later was strongly influenced by its Greek predecessor. The Romans adopted a similar religion, political structure, and even a set of social norms. From the example of Alexander the Great, the function of warfare as a progenitor of new nation-states and empires, along with their corresponding social values, can be easily seen.

While the “functionalism” idea of the sociological perspective of war focuses on its social functions, the “symbolic interactionism” idea emphasizes some social phenomena that can be discovered while waging a war. During wars, societies tend to idolize and glorify people or political and cultural ideologies. These “idols” serve as symbols to usually marshal support for war. From a historical point of view, this phenomenon of idolizing and glorifying stems from the earliest communities over five millennia ago. Some communities set up totems that their social members worshipped. These totems effectively served a symbolic role in expressing the collective beliefs of these communities. Their role was reinforced by the human language, namely its capability to persuade others to believe in the same fictional idea or symbol.

Different forms of government historically employed different forms and methods of idolization. For states with greater centralization of power, their idols or tenets that they “deified” were often more specific and grounded in reality. Aside from Hitler and Nazi Germany, the French state under the rule of Napoleon Bonaparte also established him as a political idol. During the Napoleonic Wars, Napoleon was idolized as a military genius and charismatic leader, allowing him to preach the importance of his wars. As a result, once the French people started to believe in him and his military doctrines, he could turn France into a war state that aimed to fulfill his purposes. The leaders of more centralized states would desire the creation of specific idols, as doing so would thrust a robust centripetal force toward themselves, helping them cling to their power. In the case of Napoleon and his wars, by setting himself as the idol for the entire French population, he could compel his subjects to commit to his war efforts and, hence, secure his base for political authority.

Historically, for states that were not so centralized, though, the idols and ideas that they held as sacred were more abstract and fictional. When Athens faced Sparta during the Peloponnesian War, it implemented a fledgling democracy. Compared to Sparta, an oligarchical state, the rulers of Athens did not exercise so much centralized power. Consequently, to rally the Athenians to support the war plans of the government, Pericles, the ultimate leader for the first three years of the war, glorified the values of “freedom,” “equality,” and “openness” of Athens. In his famous “Funeral Oration,” given to boost the morale of the Athenians, he exclaimed, “If we look to the laws, they afford equal justice to all in their private differences…If a man is able to serve the state, he is not hindered by the obscurity of his condition. The freedom we enjoy in our government extends also to our ordinary life. There, far from exercising a jealous surveillance over each other, we do not feel called upon to be angry with our neighbor for doing what he likes…” This passage suggests that Pericles attempted to compel the Athenians to invest in the war effort by appealing to the social values that Athens as a state upheld as inalienable. For a less centralized state like Athens, idolizing “ideas” rather than specific leaders delivered a more long-lasting and far-reaching effect. This is because only ideas, not leaders, are truly capable of connecting a diverse group of individuals firmly with a strong, determined common belief.

The concepts of the “functionalism” and “symbolic interactionism” of warfare developed by various sociologists are valuable assets in analyzing human wars. This essay, through a selection of historical examples, testified to this claim further. However, it is equally important to note the potential limitations of these two concepts. Since they were developed purely by Western scholars, they might not target non-Western ways of war effectively. In other words, as war has been conceived of and practiced differently worldwide, it is nearly impossible to ascribe a universal sociological theory to cover all cases and aspects of human warfare. When current sociological theories reach their limit, historical theories and knowledge can help to break the limit and inspire new research. To fully understand the mechanisms of warfare and thus contemplate ways to restrain it, sociology, philosophy, economics, psychology, and an array of other subjects should provide the backbone of research. At the same time, history should strengthen this backbone and give it further branches to grow.

论战争的社会学视角

对于战争的悖论，人们可以从不同角度解释其合理性。然而，由于战争本质上是社会的产物（即只有当人们凝聚成更加复杂和多样化的社会时，战争才成为不可避免的现象），因此，笔者尤其有兴趣从社会学的角度来审视战争，研究社会学学科如何解释这一人类现象。就战争这一主题而言，将社会学与历史学并列是有帮助的。社会学旨在 "提取 "战争的理论根源，而历史学则可以用实际案例来支持和验证社会学的工作。本文正是试图将这两个学科并列起来，作者将证明 "功能主义 "与 "符号互动主义 "的社会学思想与历史上一些最经典的战争案例是有强相关性的。

首先要探讨的社会学概念是 "功能主义"。从本质上讲，坚持功能主义的学者认为，战争有几个重要的功能，其中一个功能就是增进社会团结。在战争场景中，一个社会将团结起来试图打败共同认为的敌人，战争因此可以起到社会粘合剂的作用，这一想法也是上一篇文章所概述的战争社会悖论的一部分。在历史上，毛泽东正是利用了战争作为一种强大的粘合剂，推进了中国社会的彻底团结。1937 年日本侵华之前，中国人没有形成一股完全统一的力量。虽然蒋介石领导的国民党是当时中国最主要的政治力量，但社会动荡使中国社会无法统一，尤其是在蒋介石提出不直接回应日本侵略的争议性计划之后。因此，当毛泽东成为共产党的领导人时，他利用抗日战争作为社会统一的号召。1937 年，共产党与国民党组成了第二次统一战线，这表明抗日使中华民族团结，成为一个统一的集体。如果没有抗战努力，在当时复杂的政治环境下，中国人民可能更难团结一致。

信奉 "功能主义 "的学者还声称，战争有时会导致 "新国家 "的发展，有时甚至会促使帝国的建立。这一点颇有道理，因为在历史上，未来国家与帝国的领导人总是通过战争来为自己的国家获取和维持领土。随着罗马共和国的衰弱，凯撒利用征服战争重新稳定了罗马文明，并建立了罗马帝国的基石。然而，当人们从 "功能主义 "的角度考虑战争的社会影响时，就必须分析战争如何通过建立国家与帝国，进一步促进一系列价值观或社会准则的传播。亚历山大大帝可以说是最成功的军事人物之一，他通过征服战争建立了一个庞大的，横跨欧洲与亚洲的帝国。尽管他的帝国在公元前 323 年后几乎立即崩溃，但其留下的社会文化遗产却变得永恒。由于他的征服努力，希腊化的思想、传统和价值观逐渐成为欧洲文明不可替代的根基。两个世纪后登上历史舞台的罗马人深受希腊社会文化的影响，他们采用了类似的宗教、政治结构，与社会规范。从亚历山大大帝的例子中，人们不难看出战争作为催化剂，不断促成新的民族国家与帝国的崛起，随之而来的社会价值观也被广泛推崇。

战争社会学视角中的 "功能主义 "思想侧重于战争的社会功能，而 "符号互动主义 "思想则强调在发动战争的过程中可以发现的一些社会现象。在战争中，社会往往会将一些人或政治文化意识形态偶像化、光荣化。这些 "偶像 "作为一种象征或符号，通常会为战争争取支持。从历史角度看，这种偶像化与光荣化现象源于五千多年前的最早人类族群。一些社区设立了图腾，供其社会成员崇拜。这些图腾有效地发挥了象征作用，表达了这些族群的集体信仰。人类的语言则进一步强化了它们的作用，即一些人利用语言，说服更多人相信相同的虚构观念或符号。

历史上，不同形态的政府采用了不同的偶像化形式与方法。对于权力更加集中的国家来说，他们"神化 "的偶像或信条往往更加具体，也更有现实基础。除了希特勒和纳粹德国，拿破仑-波拿巴统治下的法国也将他树立为政治偶像。在拿破仑战争期间，拿破仑作为军事天才及富有魅力的领袖被神化，这种偶像崇拜使他得以宣扬他的战争的重要性。因此，一旦法国人民开始相信他和他的军事理论，他就能把法国变成一个旨在实现其目的的战争机器。中央集权国家的领导人会更渴望创造特定具体的偶像，因为这样做会带来强大的权力向心力，帮助他们牢牢握住绝对权威。就拿破仑与他的战争而言，通过将自己树立为全体法国人民的偶像，他可以迫使臣民为他的战争努力做出承诺，从而确保他的政治权力基础。

不过，从历史上看，对于中央集权程度不高的国家来说，他们的偶像或奉为神圣的理念更为抽象与虚构。伯罗奔尼撒战争期间，雅典与斯巴达对峙，雅典实行的是刚刚起步的民主制度。这意味着，与寡头政治的斯巴达相比，雅典的统治者并没有行使那么集中的权力。因此，为了号召雅典人支持政府的战争计划，战争头三年的领导人伯里克利光荣化了雅典的 "自由"、"平等 "与"开放"价值观。为了鼓舞雅典人的士气，他在著名的 "国葬演说 "中感叹道："如果我们看一下法律，它们为所有人的私人分歧提供了平等的公正......如果一个人能够为这个国家服务，他就不会因为他的身份不显赫而受到阻碍。我们在政府中享有的自由也延伸到我们的日常生活中。在那里，我们不会相互猜忌，也不会因为邻居做了他喜欢做的事而生气......" 这段话表明，伯里克利试图通过呼吁雅典作为一个国家所坚持的不可剥夺的社会价值观来迫使雅典人投入战争的努力中。对于像雅典这样中央集权程度较低的国家来说，崇拜 "思想 "而不是具体的领导人，会产生更持久、更深远的影响。这是因为，只有思想，而非领袖，才能真正将不同的个人群体与坚定的共同信仰紧密联系在一起。

不同社会学家提出的战争 "功能主义 "与"符号互动主义 "概念是分析人类战争的宝贵财富。本文通过选取历史实例，进一步证明了这一观点。然而，同样重要的是要注意到这两个概念的潜在局限性。由于这两个概念纯粹由西方学者提出，它们可能无法有效地针对非西方的战争方式。换句话说，由于世界各地对战争的理解及实践各不相同，因此几乎不可能归纳出一种普遍的社会学理论来涵盖人类战争的所有情况与方面。当当前的社会学理论达到极限时，历史理论和知识可以帮助打破极限，启发新的研究。要全面了解战争的机理，进而思考克制战争的方法，人们要思考不同学科间的互动关系。作者认为，社会学、哲学、经济学、心理学等一系列学科应成为研究的主干，而历史学则应加强这一主干的稳固，并为其提供更多的生长枝条。